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The issue of Western perceptions of Islam, and concerns about Islamic ideology vis-
à-vis the relation of Muslims to the West, constitute topics of ongoing concern both 
for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. They have come to the fore in a dramatic sense 
this century with the terrorist attacks in America on September 11, 2001, and the 
recent bombings in London, together with many events of global significance in 
between.  
 
For the purpose of this seminar I want to do two things. First, I shall undertake a 
critical review of some key dimensions of Western perceptions of Islam. Second, I 
shall outline the broad range of ideological options that have arisen in the modern era 
in order to highlight shifts of focus and emphasis that have occurred over the last 




The Western perception of Islam is dominated by misrepresentation and distorted 
image, which derive largely from misunderstanding and ignorance. I contend that 
„ignorance‟ may be manifest in at least three modalities or kinds, namely innocent, 
blind and culpable. On the one hand there is innocent ignorance, or ignorance 
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simpliciter, namely the situation of a naïve „not-knowing‟, yielding the direct and 
unequivocal „don‟t know‟ response when a question of knowledge or perception is 
posed. However, this form of ignorance may provide opportunity for correction 
through the provision of information and the processes of education. It implies no 
intentional prejudice on the part of the one who is innocently ignorant.  
  
On the other hand, blind ignorance is something else again. It is ignorance born of an 
intellectual incapability, or cognitive barrier, that effectively prevents any „seeing‟ or 
„knowing‟ other than what has been dictated by the worldview perspectives held. It 
yields a „can‟t know – it‟s beyond our ken‟ response. Knowledge, and an image, of 
the other are so utterly proscribed by the worldview of the knower that no alternative 
perspective or image is admissible. Here the notion of applying a corrective simply 
through information is inadequate. Any educational process, if attempted, will 
require sustained and careful execution to effect any real change. Even if change is 
unwelcome or resisted, the premise of this mode of ignorance is basically cognitive 
inertia, which in principle can be overcome. Indeed it is this modality of ignorance 
that yields to the great changes in social ordering and cultural life as happened, for 
instance, in the momentous changes brought about in the USA by the civil rights 
movement in the twentieth century. 
 
However, there is yet another kind of ignorance that goes beyond even that 
occasioned by the blinding effect of a limited perspective and an intransigently closed 
mind. This third kind is culpable ignorance, that is, an active ignoring: the deliberate 
refusal to know, the avoidance of the challenge to cognitive change, the 
reinforcement of a prejudicial perspective by deliberately ignoring the issue at hand. 
This is ignorance born of an active dismissal of alternative possibilities, the out-of-
hand rejection of options presented for alternate ways of thinking, understanding and 
interpreting. This modality goes hand-in-glove with the attitude and mindset that 
harbours most forms of fundamentalism. It produces an intentional „won‟t know‟ or 
„not wanting to know‟ response. It is resistant to any information contrary to its own; 
it is inimical to educational process; it treats cognitive change as effectively, if not 
actually, treasonable.  
 
  3  
 
As with all conflicts the first casualty, it is said, is truth. How much of the media 
portrayal and the deluge of analytical articles, for and against either side in the so-
called „war on terrorism‟ – with the unspoken, but generally universally assumed, 
understanding that it is „Islamic terrorism‟ that is in the frame – is the product of 
propaganda, the machination of so-called political „spin-doctors‟, or just the 
uncritical reflection of stereotypical image and biased (mis)perception? Image 
distortion derived from ignorance, of whatever kind, continues to impact upon the 
world in ways that now make the issues I am seeking to address even more urgent.  
 
What, then, could be identified as predominant Western perceptions of Islam? Or 
perhaps, better, what is the predominant perception, at least so far as that can be 
detected, in the „Western‟ mind? Of course, the way the question is put, and the way 
it is usually answered, is a gross oversimplification of a complex issue. But, for the 
sake of discussion and argument, the simple approach is not without foundation and 
validity. For the answer, arguably and sad to say, is a negative one. It is best summed 
up by the word „threat‟. We may see this negative reaction both through media image 
and report, and, more particularly, how people in the West may be observed reacting 
to such image and reportage. Indeed it can seem that nearly all news concerning 
Islam that is reported in our papers or covered on television concerns aggressive 
Muslim action of one sort or another.  
 
The media image of Islam that is portrayed is all too often a threatening one, and in 
the uncritical Western imagination the particular and dramatic activities of some 
specific Muslims is generalized: thus the religion, Islam, is perceived as itself a 
threat. There are undoubtedly many elements that contribute to the image or, perhaps 
better, the process of imaging, Islam and thereby to the construct of the Islam of 
imagination. What I propose at this juncture is to reflect upon the question of what 
constitutes the imaging process as such: what are the factors that shape and influence 
the Western perceptions of Islam? This is the issue of image analysis – where does 
the Western image derive from? What critical factors are at play? By way of a foray 
into the subject the following outline of a programme of analysis seems to me to be 
appropriate.  
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1. The picture of Islam portrayed in the West is first and foremost an imaginative 
construct shaped by media images; in other words, Western perceptions are media-
shaped. It goes without saying that the primary, and for many the only, exposure to 
Islam is via television news-coverage, newspaper reportage, and cinematic 
presentation. All too often, however, these media project images of Islam that are 
little more than stereotypes. Nonetheless it is the stereotypical image that powerfully 
influences the formation of imagination, both for the individual and also in respect of 
the collective or common communal perception. Of course, the predominance of 
visual image, in a video age, hardly needs to be stressed. But, as well, the impact of 
the printed word, whether in newspaper, news-journal, popular book or tract, 
contributes significantly to the image-making effect of the media.  However, all this 
really doesn‟t tell us much. What gives form and content to the image shaping so 
conveyed? What constitutes the image held in the imagination? Given the 
incontrovertible pervasiveness of the media in the process of image-formation – and 
even allowing for the recognition that there is more than a grain of truth in the adage 
that „the medium is the message‟ – what gives the image its substance? This brings 
me to the second item. 
 
2. Perceptions of Islam are shaped by the forces of political domination. This is the 
two-edged sword of the predominance of political material as the source and focus of 
much media coverage, and the filtering effect of editorial choice and decision-making 
by those who control the media. Whether intentional or not, the selection of material, 
the way it is presented – the casting of the news – will reflect at least prior 
assumptions and agendas of a broadly political nature. Arguably all editing, all 
redaction, is a political act in the sense of not being undertaken in a cognitive vacuum 
but rather being guided, at least, by consideration of desired effects or the dictates of 
sub-text message, propaganda, and the like. Despite the profession of objective 
neutrality of a reporter, and the supposed neutral objectivity of the camera – which 
„never lies‟ – the outcome, in terms of presented image, necessarily yields to the 
language of the report and the angle of the camera-shot (the more graphic, stark, or 
dramatic, the more likely it will be aired or printed). This undoubtedly implies, even 
in a broad sense of the term, that there is a dimension of political domination in the 
image product, which is then projected through the media. But what does this all 
mean? We can begin to construct an answer by turning to the third critical item. 
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3. For the most part the image of Islam projected via the media lacks an authentic 
framework for interpretation. The portrayed image of Islam is often contextually-
loose: it is lacking in context, or is „loose‟ in the sense of only a simplistic – often 
assumed and thus likely false or misleading – contextual reference being given. So, 
that which feeds the collective imagination, which in turn holds, embellishes, and 
draws upon the image for a variety of purposes, lacks appropriate contextual 
reference points. Certainly, for the most part at least, it would be true to say that both 
the projection and reception of the image of Islam is conducted with a bare 
minimum, if any, of attention paid to proper contextual factors. Of course good 
investigative journalists and reputable news reporters will defend their locating of 
reportage in context.  
 
I am not saying that good contextualising of the image does not happen at all. Only 
that the predominant image of Islam in the West does not, in fact, come with an 
appropriate or authentic hermeneutical guide. Thus, for example, Islam is too 
frequently and falsely perceived as a monolithic entity; as an avaricious self-
aggrandizing religious culture; as non self-critical or reflective; as archaic, time-
locked, and Middle Eastern. So the image of Islam, for the most part at least, is in 
reality contextually loose – it is not rooted in sound contextual appreciation and 
understanding – so far as the Western imagination is concerned. This results in … 
 
4. A religiously-skewed image of Islam. Here I refer simply to the fact that Islam is 
not perceived as religion as such, or in a balanced way. That is to say, it is not, as it 
should be, presented as being a spiritual path, inherently holistic in its outlook and 
application. Rather the idea of religion that is attached to the term „Islam‟ is itself 
skewed or conceptually twisted. It is off-centre, unbalanced so as to reinforce 
negative, even false, representations of Islam. For instance, the politico-juristic 
elements of Islam are over-stressed in comparison with the theological and pietistic 
dimensions; the pragmatics of Islamic programs predominates over an awareness of 
Muslim ethical sensibilities and reflections. And the underlying and deeper raison 
d’être for any given Islamic action is thereby lost to view. The religious depth is 
trivialized: the picture remaining is two-dimensional. And so we are brought to the 
fifth component of my critical analysis.  
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5. The image of Islam is that of an  id eo lo gically -o p p o sit io n al „r e ligio u s 
o t h e r ‟. Islam is portrayed as the de facto oppositional religion to Christianity, and 
vice versa; and further, Muslims are portrayed as de facto oppositional, religiously 
and politically, to Jews, and vice versa. In the context of a wider and general Western 
perspective, Islam is the presumed ideological rival, par excellence, to the West. 
Inherent in the image is the product of the process I have analysed so far. Islam is no 
friendly rival as in a competing sports-team. Rather this rival is so completely „other‟ 
that the prospect of confrontation is couched in dramatic terms and fearful 
expectation. Thus Islam is portrayed as the Great Threat, the ultimate opponent (so 
Samuel Huntingdon, et. al.) in a climatic and apocalyptic clash of civilizations; the 
historical antithesis to the West‟s thesis. Religious extremists of variant Christian 
types will transmute the antithesis to an antichrist image. Islam is then portrayed, 
ideologically, as the great contemporary satanic opponent to an idealised Judeo-
Christian West. And, ironically, the vice versa holds: to many in the Islamic world it 
is the West that is the demonic opposition, with America itself identified as the Great 
Satan. But such ideological oppositions are little more than mirror images of 
extremely fundamentalist and exclusivist religious postures. 
 
6. So it is that Islam gets presented in terms of a sociologically misrepresented 
image. Islam is deemed to be, in a variety of ways, sociologically „out of control‟. It 
will produce a Saddam Hussein, who for a long time no one seemed able to curb; an 
Osama bin Laden, with his network of terrorists evoking massive retaliatory and 
expurgatory action, and who no-one seems able to pin down. It will produce a 
plethora of countries where political volatility and/or communal violence seem 
commonplace. On the one hand, Islam appears to produce much rhetoric concerning 
peaceful co-existence and membership in the world community, yet on the other will 
foment virulent policies of opposition to the West and to Zionism and, in some cases, 
to Christianity or at least to Christian churches and related organizations. Such active 
opposition may be directed against Israel and may even produce a negative response 
to Judaism, Quranic injunctions to the contrary notwithstanding. It certainly has 
produced an overriding and alarmingly growing negative response to Jews as such. 
This confused representation will reflect on Islam as having an aura of inner conflict 
and lack of concerted direction for its own good, politically speaking.  
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To be sure there is great social and political, and even ideological, variety throughout 
the world of Islam, and much diversity in localized political expression and 
difference in the way specific issues and agendas occupy the energies of Muslims. 
This diversity does not mean Islam is a threat by virtue of being, in some vague 
sense, out of control as a sociological entity. Indeed the countervailing impetus to 
unity within the worldwide Islamic community, which acts as an internal check and 
corrective upon some of the more volatile elements, is not to be misread as 
suggesting the possibility that Islam may yet become the monolith it is feared to be 
already. Rather, it suggests that the dialectic implied in the tension between the ideal 
of an overarching unity of the Islamic community, and the variegated reality of it in 
practice only reflects the fact of Islam being an authentic and complex religio-
political entity. So our attention now turns to the second task of this seminar 




Islam is found across some four dozen nations where Muslims form the majority of 
the populace, and throughout many other lands where Muslims are in the minority. 
Ideologically speaking, the Islamic nations and countries constitute one vast notional 
socio-geographic and religious entity – dar al-Islam – to which minority Muslim 
communities elsewhere are associated to form a single overarching religious 
community, the ummah. But in contrast to the ideal and ideology of the one world-
wide Islamic community, there have in fact been – and indeed are today – many 
Muslim „worlds‟, or particular major communities and cultures. The diversity of 
these Muslim worlds reflects varieties of contemporary political orientation and 
regional geography. Against the notional unity of the Islamic community (ummah), 
under girded by a religious ideology of unity (tawhid), there is the concrete reality of 
a multiplicity of national Islamic entities and identities. So an internal pluralist 
reality co-exists in tension with the ideology of a global communal unity. This 
tension between the reality of socio-political diversity and the ideals of religious 
unity is an inherent problematic within the world of Islam. One Muslim commentator 
has noted that: 
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whereas in the early centuries of development of social institutions in 
Islam, Islam started from a clean slate, as it were, and had to carve out 
ab initio a social fabric ... now, when Muslims have to face a situation 
of fundamental rethinking and reconstruction, their acute problem is 
precisely to determine how far to render the slate clean again and on 
what principles and by what methods, in order to create a new set of 
institutions.1  
 
An ethic of radical, even revolutionary, change and disruption as being valid, even 
needful, has predominated throughout the history of Islam. But such change was 
intended to effect a return to the pristine forms of the original Islamic institutional 
structure and religious life, not to engender further novel development of the 
religion. This leads to a deep inherent tension between conservative tendencies (the 
maintenance of the received tradition of religion) and radical tendencies (the return 
to the roots of religion). Each can engender change, yet each can resist further 
novelty: it all depends on context and circumstance. The conservative may call for 
revitalisation of institutions and the revival of religious sensibilities and in the 
process labelled a „fundamentalist‟. But this could apply equally to the radical who 
critiques the socio-political status quo and advocates revolutionary change in order to 
regain true values and the realignment of the institutional expression of Islam.  
 
It has been in response to the exigencies of the modern world, and the struggle to 
find identity and a place within it, or in distinction from it, that contemporary Islamic 
ideology needs to be understood. A range of Islamic ideological responses, or 
options, have arisen. These include, at one end of the spectrum, the call of the radical 
Islamist for total Islamisation, that is, that Islamic law (Shari‘a) should govern every 
part of life. At the other end of the spectrum Muslim modernists have advocated the 
abandonment of early Islamic politico-religious ideals in favour of the privatisation 
of religion. This is the model of Western secularism and, of course, it is anathema to 
the dedicated Islamist. But between modernist reform at one end, and Islamist 
revivalism at the other, there are many variant positions on the spectrum of 
                                      
1  Fa zlu r  Ra h m a n  Islam , 2 1 4  
  9  
 
ideological option that may be – and often are – taken.2  Ideological options which 
have predominated the Islamic world during the modern era may be summarily 
identified as Traditionalism, Modernism, Pragmatic Secularism, and Islamism. 
 
(i) Traditionalism 
Traditionalism refers to an ideology of affirming the received traditions of belief and 
practice such that “change should not and does not affect the traditions of the past. 
Change is to be rejected.”3 This would seem to yield an entrenched conservatism, or 
an outlook which holds to past methods and perspectives come what may. 
Westernisation is viewed as a “temptation ... to be resisted”. Traditionalism is the 
conserving ideology, the perspective that seeks to maintain the religious tradition as 
such, which eschews change for change‟s sake, but which may employ coping 
mechanisms, not to effect change, but rather to uphold the tradition through changing 
circumstance. Variants within this category include, on the one hand, a „rejectionist‟ 
hard-line view (no allowance for change whatever) and, on the other, an 
„adaptationist‟ stance which makes some concession, at least in respect of process, on 
the basis that, as a cultural entity, Islam has “always been able to cope with change 
and has built into its structures ways of dealing with change.”4 Thus, whilst its 
sources (Qur’an and Sunna) remain unchanged, novel situations could be managed 
by way of the institutionalised legal systems pertinent to the particular local Islamic 
community.  
 
(ii)  Modernism 
Modernism has its genesis in the 19
th
 century when the spirit of European optimism, 
liberality and progressivism impacted pervasively upon both European and colonial 
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life, hence the colonised Islamic countries, and indeed any Islamic country that had a 
close relation to the West. Modernists extract values and principles from the 
authority sources and traditions and argue for, and allow, modification of practice in 
accordance with contemporary need. Indeed they would argue that this is in fact how 
the different traditions have arisen through time and what keeps a religion vibrant 
and relevant. Thus Islamic modernists emerged with an ideology that attempted a 
defence of contemporary civilisation in terms of traditional Islam, striving to adopt 
whatever was perceived to be beneficial, yet retaining the framework of the Shari’a 
and the religious life. Islamic modernists have generally attempted  
 
to establish a continuity between their Islamic heritage and modern 
change. On the one hand, they identified with premodern revivalist 
movements and called for the purification of internal deficiencies and 
deviations. On the other, they borrowed and assimilated new ideas and 
values from the West.5  
 
Modernists attempt to adapt Islam to changing conditions and circumstances. To that 
extent they are the champions of the view that religion is a living thing; change and 
adaptation are a natural component of living entities of whatever type. In short, 
Islamic modernism, or modernist reform, identifies a reinterpreted Islam as the basis 
for both political and religious life. It draws on an inherent capacity within Islam for 
flexibility of application and interpretation. A high idealistic valuation of Islam 
becomes the ideological leitmotif driving political engagement. It promises much but 
it would seem, at least in the present day, it has difficulty in successfully engaging 
with the broad realities of contemporary Islamic life. Modernism, as a term of 
description, can mean different things to different people in different circumstances.  
 
(iii) Pragmatic Secularism 
Pragmatic Secularism views Islam in the modern world as a purely religious 
phenomenon, without political dimension or force. Radical social reorganisation 
occurs without recourse to religious jurisdiction as was the case, for example, in 
communist Albania. Turkey pursued a vigorous secularising process of separating 
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religion from politics throughout much of the twentieth century: as well as replacing 
the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet, Turkey‟s “suppression of Islamic legal and 
educational institutions and the outlawing of mystical Sufi groups were other steps in 
the removal of religion from the apparatus of the state.”6 In countries that are 
officially secular so far as their political constitution is concerned, Islam can find 
itself confronted with the challenge of adjusting to, or contending with, variants of 
nationalism, capitalism or socialism. As a result, further pragmatic variants include 
“religious secularism” (as in Indonesia‟s multi-faith system); and “Muslim 
secularism” (as in Egypt‟s constitutional placing of religion, specifically Islam, as 
having a role in, but not being the basis of, political life).7 
 
(iv) Islamism 
Islamism is the relatively recent contemporary development referring to the position 
of contending for the full application of Qur‟anic principles and values and the 
dismissal of all else. Islamism, or Islamic revivalism, accepts change, albeit in a 
controlled fashion. It uses the religious authoritative sources of Islam (Qur’an and 
Sunna) to legitimise change. Ibrahim Karawan states that Islamism 
 
refers to the movements and ideologies that claim Islam, as they 
interpret it, as the basis for restructuring contemporary states and 
societies according to an idealised image of Islam‟s founding period... 
Hence, Islamists talk of the need to return to Islamic roots and a „golden 
age‟….8 
 
The singular defining characteristic of Islamism is the concern to gain political 
power: religion is not confined to the realm of the private and personal, but is 
necessarily in the public domain and so carries with it an active concern for the 
political life of the society. Therefore obtaining the controlling interest in politics is 
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critical for Islamists “if they are to reshape society, politics, the economy and culture 
in accordance with what they deem to be God‟s ultimate will.”9  
 
Muslim revivalist movements are often also characterised by their concern for the 
perceived socio-moral decline of Muslims and, when this applies, they advocate an 
intentional return to the origins of the religion and the shedding of all accretions of 
legal and mystic traditions. They tend also to reject the predeterministic outlook of 
popularist Islam and the dominant theology of the day, and in some circumstances 
they are inclined to effect, or at least attempt, revivalist reform through armed force. 
The Islamic revivalist will use the authority sources of past tradition to legitimate 
present day change in the sense of an active promotion of change from an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs to that of an ideal “what should be”. Thus the goal of 
establishing an Islamic state is viewed as a necessary precursor to achieving an 
Islamic society, per se. 
 
A set of five themes that demonstrate the nature of Islamism have been identified by 
one Muslim scholar, Makmud Faksh.10 The first is the fusion of religion and politics, 
which is the expression of the holistic view of Islam as “both an ideology and a 
system of life”.11 The second is the notion of Divine Sovereignty or Rule (Hakimiyya) 
which expresses the cardinal principle that political order is subservient to the rules 
of Shari’a: human rulers and political leaders are merely God's representatives and 
are to be judged according to the fidelity and integrity of their representation. The 
third theme is that of Islamic authenticity being asserted over against jahiliyya, the 
state of deep spiritual ignorance. The new jahiliyya against which Islam is pitted is 
the seduction of Western culture and values viewed as inherently antithetical to 
Islamic culture and values. Islamic universalism (as in the ummah) over against 
nationalist particularism (qawmiyya) constitutes the fourth theme. Any and all forms 
of nationalism, including pan-Arab nationalism, are to be rejected. The fifth and final 
theme, one which redounds throughout much revivalist and fundamentalist literature 
and rhetoric, is that of jihad. The dynamic and comprehensive interpretation of this 
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core religious motif, whose root meaning has to do with the constant struggle for 
belief over unbelief, the right and the good over against error and evil, gives a sharp 
edge to revivalist ideologies. 
 
Islamists may also be viewed as falling into two broad categories, viz militant and 
political. The former combine “ideological purity and deep contempt for political 
compromise with a keen sense of urgency for direct Islamic action.” They tend “to 
act as dedicated fighters against states which they see as embodying contemporary 
„ignorance‟ – jahiliyya.”12 Militant Islamists will pursue destructive and destabilising 
strategies in the interests of waging a war of attrition against the State. As the current 
socio-political order is, by definition as it were, totally rejected by a militant 
perspective, such Islamists continue the struggle for as long as it takes: surrender is 
unthinkable, compromise anathema – anything less than the achievement of the goal 
is tantamount to apostasy. However, it is the nature of this phenomenon that militant 
groups are highly competitive, fractious and exclusivist. As a movement, militant 
Islamism is highly fissiparous.13  
 
The American scholar of Islam, John Esposito, has summarised the ideological 
framework of Islamism as follows.14 Islamism holds that Islam is a total and 
comprehensive way of life; Muslim societies have failed due to their departure from 
the “straight path of Islam” and their following a Western secular path; the renewal 
of society requires a return to pure Islam and the advancement of an Islamic religio-
political and social reformation or revolution. Furthermore, in pursuit of this, 
Western-inspired civil codes must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the only 
acceptable blueprint for Muslim society. However, although Westernisation of 
society is condemned, modernisation as such is not. That is to say, science and 
technology are accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islamic belief and values. 
Finally, the process of Islamisation requires organizations or associations of 
dedicated and trained Muslims.  
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So where is Islam headed today? It is the ideology of Islamism that, without doubt, 
has the lead in today‟s Islam. Contemporary expressions emanating from the 
Wahhabi form of Sunni Islam in Saudi Arabia, or the neo-Deobandi madrassas of 
Pakistan, have given apologetic reference for the globalisation of terrorist extremism 
as in the al-Qaeda movement. In its myriad forms, Islamism expresses the most 
dramatic dimension of the international face of Islam. It involves piety, yet increased 
devotion doesn‟t just focus on religious observance but also on “the social, 
economic, and political application of Islamic values.”15 The critical factor is that it is 
Islam, and not a secular ideology, which shapes attitudes and directs actions. 
Islamism involves a high level conscientisation process and a deeply held 
intentionality. Further, there are many disquieting elements associated with the 
development process which act as catalysts for revival together with a wide range and 
number of attempts to make Islam politically relevant. Religion is cast in the role of 
the critic of government. But there is no overall coordination to the phenomenon of 
Islamic revivalism. Rather it is marked by a high level of idiosyncretism and local 
flavour: “the form that revival takes and the effect that it produces vary according to 
circumstance and place.”16 And, of course, that revivalism within Islam attracts a 
perception of militancy is a function of the way in which it has “has captured most 
attention in the West and generated negative, undifferentiated images.”17 
 
It must, of course, be stressed that the vast majority of Muslim people are moderate 
in their outlook in that reform would be seen as something that occurs through the 
gradual transformation of Muslim society rather than being effected through violent 
revolution, which in reality is a minority perspective, even though it is the one that 
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